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I will then post the comments for you myself and reply to them.
Thank you for understanding.
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Bill Vallicella has done me the honor of publishing three substantial posts in response to the neo-Aristotelian anti-realist theory of universals I have found myself advocating; this by a man who suffers not even sages lightly, let alone the fools among whom some might quite easily include me.
I set forth the theory in question in two recent posts, that of October 6th, 2011, “An Aristotelian Basis for a Neo-Aristotelian Anti-realism in the Theory of Universals,” and that of October 13th, 2011, “Another Aristotelian Basis for a Neo-Aristotelian Anti-realism in the Theory of Universals.” (I’ll give the URLs for my two posts and for Bill’s at the end of this one; the explanation of why I proceed thus clunkily can be found in my two posts.)
1. In the second of his two posts, the “Accidental Sameness: Defending Hennessey Against My Objection” of October 19, 2011, Bill formulates my thesis as follows:
Hennessey’s theory is that “. . . only if the referent of the ‘Socrates’ and that of the ‘sitting’ of ‘Socrates is sitting’ are identical can it be true that Socrates is actually the one sitting.” The idea seems to be that accidental predications can be understood as identity statements. Thus ‘Socrates is seated’ goes over into (what is claimed to be) the logically equivalent ‘Socrates is (identical to) seated-Socrates.’ Accordingly, our sample sentence is construed, not as predicating a property of Socrates, a property he instantiates, but as affirming the identity of Socrates with the referent of ‘seated-Socrates.’
2. Bill’s objection to my thesis has two principles as its bases. One is that of the Indiscernibility of Identicals: (x)(y)(Ixy –> (φ)(φx < --> φy)) or, in near-English: Any existent x and any existent y are identical only if, for any attribute φ, x has φ if and only if y has φ. The pertinence of this principle to the case at hand is evident in Bill’s (Ibid.):
Clearly, Socrates and seated-Socrates do not share all properties despite their sameness. They differ temporally and modally. Socrates exists at times at which seated-Socrates does not exist (though not conversely). And it is possible that Socrates exist without seated-Socrates existing (though not conversely).
Now it is true that Socrates not sitting does not have all and only the attributes that Socrates sitting has. So I agree with (albeit with some hesitation over “at every world”) (Ibid.):
‘Socrates is seated’ is an example of an accidental predication. For surely it is no part of Socrates’ essence or nature that he be seated. There is no broadly logical necessity that he be seated at any time at which he is seated, and there are plenty of times at which he is not seated. ‘Socrates is seated’ contrasts with the essential predication ‘Socrates is human.’ Socrates is human at every time at which he exists and at every world at which he exists.
I persist, however, in thinking that Socrates not-sitting and Socrates sitting are identical. I persist in so thinking because it seems to me certain that the Socrates who is not sitting, at some one time and in some one way or respect, and the Socrates who is sitting, at another time or in another way or respect, are identical, despite the differences. That is, I get out of the difficulty Bill sees me to be in by resorting to a fuller, though even less Englishy, statement of the principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals: Any existent x and any existent y are identical only if, for any attribute φ at any one time and in any one respect, x has φ if and only if y has φ.
3. I hope that I won’t seem churlish in not accepting the way out, that of Michael Rea, that Bill offers me in the same post. When I read:
When Socrates sits down, seated-Socrates comes into existence. When he stands up or adopts some other nonseated posture, seated-Socrates passes out of existence. This ‘kooky’ or ‘queer’ object is presumably a particular, not a universal, though it is not a substance.
I cannot help but agree that the seated-Socrates in question, as a being other than Socrates, is a “‘kooky’ or ‘queer’ object.” And I cannot help but wonder how anyone who rejects universals could be tempted to multiply entities and accept such a “‘kooky’ or ‘queer’ object.”
4. The other of the two principles basing Bill’s objection to my thesis is that of the Necessity of Identity. In his “Comments on Richard Hennessey’s Neo-Aristotelian Theory of Predication ” of October 18, 2011, after stating my thesis, he includes a statement of the principle of the Necessity of Identity within one of his objection to my thesis:
If x and y are identical, then this is necessarily so. Call this the Necessity of Identity. More precisely: for any x, y, if x = y, then necessarily, x = y. Equivalent contrapositive: if possibly ~(x = y), then ~(x = y). It follows that if Socrates is identical to some sitting being, then necessarily he is identical to that sitting being. But in that case it would not be possible for Socrates not to be a sitting being. This, however, is possible. Sometimes he is on his feet walking around, other times he is flat on his back, and he has even been observed standing on his head. And please note that even if, contrary to fact, Socrates was always seated, it would still be possible for him not to be seated. The mere possibility of his not being seated shows that he cannot be identical to some sitting being.
Bill is right in his identification of the implications of adopting the thesis of the Necessity of Identity, certainly through the “if Socrates is identical to some sitting being, then necessarily he is identical to that sitting being.” I can even accept the next statement, “in that case it would not be possible for Socrates not to be a sitting being,” provided that we add, again, the further qualification, “at the same time and in the same way or respect.” For, as the Aristotle of old would have pointed out, it is impossible for one and the same being to be both sitting and not sitting, at the same time and in the same way or respect; equivalently, it is necessary for one and the same being not to be both sitting and not sitting, at the same time and in the same way or respect. This even as the same Aristotle of old would have allowed that it is quite possible for one and the same being to be both sitting and not sitting, albeit at different times or in different ways or respects.
If we don’t add that qualification, then, quite frankly, I don’t know of any reason why one should accept the thesis of the Necessity of Identity.
5. Let me take a slightly different tack. I will drop the use of the word, “identical,” conceding that its meaning can be so understood as to have the relationship designated by “identity” be subject to the principle of the Necessity of Identity. I propose instead to use the verb “be,” though I am not sure whether or not my “be” will be the “predicative” one of which Bill speaks. Then, modifying the formulation of “Hennessey’s theory” found in the passage quoted above at the top of this post, i.e.:
[O]nly if the referent of the ‘Socrates’ and that of the ‘sitting’ of ‘Socrates is sitting’ are identical can it be true that Socrates is actually the one sitting.
so that it reads:
Only if the referent of the ‘Socrates’ in ‘Socrates is sitting’ is the referent of the ‘sitting’ in the same affirmation can it be true that Socrates is actually the one sitting. (The use of italics in is is simply to draw attention to the verb, not to give it a special meaning.)
I believe that my neo-Aristotelian thesis of anti-realism in the theory of universals can rest quite happily on this restated basis.
6. Near the very end of his “Comments on Richard Hennessey’s Neo-Aristotelian Theory of Predication” Bill says:
Note that my objection can be met without invoking universals. One could say that ‘Socrates’ in our sample sentence refers to Socrates, that ‘sitting’ refers to a particularized property (a trope), and that the ‘is’ is the ‘is’ of predication, not identity. Accordingly, there is not an identity between Socrates and a sitting being; the particularized property being-seated inheres in Socrates, where inherence, unlike identity, is asymmetrical.
If we tweak the passage a bit, we can, it strikes me, improve the thesis about the referencing at work in the sentence “Socrates is sitting” so that it offers a more satisfactory support of the neo-Aristotelian thesis of anti-realism in the theory of universals, one indeed getting along “without invoking universals.” First, let us speak of “particular property” instead of “particularized property,” for the latter expression suggests, at least to me, that the property would be, prior to some act of particularization, a universal and not a particular. Let us then accept, but with a precision, Bill’s statement that “‘sitting’ refers to a particularized property (a trope),” saying instead that while the “Socrates” in our statement refers to Socrates, the person at present sitting, the “sitting” primarily refers to Socrates, the person at present sitting, and also co-refers to the particular property of sitting that inheres in Socrates. (An alternative terminology might have it that the “Socrates” in our statement denotes Socrates and the “sitting” primarily denotes Socrates, still the person sitting, and also connotesthe property of sitting that inheres in Socrates; come to think of it, I believe I recall having read, long ago, a similar distinction in the Petite logique of Jacques Maritain, a book which I no longer have, thanks to a flooded basement.)
7. At the end of “Accidental Sameness and its Logical Properties,” the third of his responses to my postings, Bill explores the concept of “accidental compounds” as a way out of the difficulties he has thought me finding myself in. Both because I believe I have herein addressed his central concerns and so need not consider adopting that way out and because the post warrants a good deal more thought on my part, I will give it that additional thought before responding to it.
8. In closing this post, I want to salute the generosity of philosophical spirit evident in all three of Bill’s posts.
P. S. The link to “An Aristotelian Basis for a Neo-Aristotelian Anti-realism in the Theory of Universals” is:
http://www.gnosisandnoesis.net/?p=1133.
The link to “Another Aristotelian Basis for a Neo-Aristotelian Anti-realism in the Theory of Universals” is:
http://www.gnosisandnoesis.net/?p=1152.
The link to “Comments on Richard Hennessey’s Neo-Aristotelian Theory of Predication ” is:
http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2011/10/comments-on-richard-hennesseys-neo-aristotelian-theory-of-predication.html.
The link to “Accidental Sameness: Defending Hennessey Against My Objection” is:
http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2011/10/accidental-sameness-defending-hennessey-against-my-objection.html.
And the link to “Accidental Sameness and its Logical Properties” is:
http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2011/10/logical-properties-of-accidental-sameness.html.
Tags: Anti-realism in the Theory of Universals, Bill Vallicella, Co-reference, connotation, Denotation, Indiscernibility of Identicals, Necessity of Identity, Predication, Reference, Universals
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1. In my immediately previous post I objected to realism in the theory of universals, i.e., to the thesis that for at least some sets of two or more similar existents, there is some numerically one essence, attribute, property, or nature by which the similar existents are what they are and are thereby similar. For example, there would be, according to this theory, some numerically one humanity, humanness, or human nature by which both Socrates and Plato are the human beings that they are and are thereby similar.
I objected to realism in the theory of universals in both its Platonist version, which holds that the numerically one essence, attribute, property, or nature by which the similar existents are what they are exists outside of or separated from those similar existents, and its Aristotelian version, which holds that the numerically one essence, attribute, property, or nature by which the similar existents are what they are exists within and not separated from those similar existents.
I offered in its stead a neo-Aristotelian universal-theoretical anti-realism. This understanding, holds, with Aristotelianism and against Platonism, that the essence, attribute, property, or nature by which an existent is what it is and is similar to others must exist within the existent. It also holds, however, against Aristotelianism, that the essence, attribute, property, or nature by which another existent is what it is and is similar to the former is not numerically one with or identical to the essence, attribute, property, or nature by which the former existent is what it is and similar to the latter. So, to return to our example, there is the humanity, humanness, or human nature by which Socrates is a human being and thereby similar to the distinct human being, Plato. And there is the humanity, humanness, or human nature by which Plato is a human being and thereby similar to the distinct human being, Socrates. But the humanity, humanness, or human nature by which Socrates is a human being is not numerically one with or identical to the humanity, humanness, or human nature by which Plato is a human being; there are as many humanities, humannesses, or human natures as there are human beings.
2. In a March 30, 2010, post on his Maverick Philosopher blog, “Scholastic Realism and Predication,” Bill Vallicella draws our attention to a critique of Platonism and concomitant defense of Aristotelianism, in its Thomistic guise, offered by John Peterson in the latter’s Introduction to Scholastic Realism (New York: Peter Lang, 1999). That which piqued my interest in Peterson’s defense is that, quite contrary to Peterson’s intentions, what he has seen as being at the core of his defense of Aristotelian realism is an understanding I have seen as being at the core of my neo-Aristotelian anti-realism.
Bill expresses the basis of Peterson’s rejection of extreme realism, i.e., Platonism, in the following manner:
As Peterson explains it, on the Thomist approach ‘human’ in ‘Socrates is human’ does not refer to a universal or to a particularized property; it “refers to the very same individual substance to which ‘Socrates’ refers.” (105) Predicates and subjects in essential predications refer to the same things, namely, “ordinary individual things.” Thus in ‘Socrates is human,’ ‘Socrates’ and ‘human’ both refer to the same individual, the human being, Socrates.
From the perspective of my neo-Aristotelianism, this Thomistic approach is very nearly correct; indeed, only if the referent of the “Socrates” and that of the “human” of “Socrates is human” are identical can the one actually be the other. I said “very nearly correct” because, in fact, it is necessary to go one step further than Peterson does. He restricts the thesis at hand to “predication by species.” As Bill sets things forth on behalf of Peterson:
Peterson’s main objection to this so-called extreme-realist scheme is that it cannot accommodate “the fact of predication by species.” (97) It cannot accommodate an essential (as opposed to accidental) predication as in the example, ‘Socrates is human.’ On extreme realism, the relation between Socrates and humanity is external: there is nothing in the nature of Socrates to require that he be human. This is puzzling, though: surely Socrates could not have been a jelly fish or a valve-lifter in a ’57 Chevy. But if Socrates is specifically human, then being human is bound up with his very identity: he cannot exist except as human. The connection between Socrates and his humanity appears to be too intimate to be understood in terms of the external relation of exemplification.
To my way of thinking, however, the difference between essential and accidental predication has no bearing on the present problem, so I would restate the “main objection” to have it say that the extreme-realist scheme cannot accommodate predication tout court. Let us take the proposition “Socrates is sitting” or the strictly equivalent “Socrates is a sitting being.” The referent of the subject term here is the sitting Socrates and that of the predicate term is one and the same sitting Socrates. Similarly, the referent of the subject term of “Plato is sitting” is the sitting Plato and that of its predicate term is one and the same sitting Plato. Here, once again, only if the referent of the “Socrates” and that of the “sitting” of “Socrates is sitting” are identical can it be true that Socrates is actually the one sitting. And, only if the referent of the “Plato” and that of the “sitting” of “Plato is sitting” are identical can it be true that Plato is actually the one sitting.
3. Bill gives a double-negative kind of recognition to the force of Peterson’s objection:
I don’t think it can be denied that there is merit to this Thomist criticism of what Peterson is calling extreme realism. But
Bill continues:
is the Thomist alternative any better? As Peterson explains it, on the Thomist approach ‘human’ in ‘Socrates is human’ does not refer to a universal or to a particularized property; it “refers to the very same individual substance to which ‘Socrates’ refers.” (105) Predicates and subjects in essential predications refer to the same things, namely, “ordinary individual things.” Thus in ‘Socrates is human,’ ‘Socrates’ and ‘human’ both refer to the same individual, the human being, Socrates.
Of course, in ‘Plato is human’ both terms refer to Plato. But isn’t humanity in some sense common to Socrates and Plato? Indeed.
The “Indeed” with which Bill has answered the question he has posed, that of whether humanity is in some sense common to Socrates and Plato, suggests that he thinks it obvious that it is. Perhaps I am wrong. At any rate, I don’t think it is at all obvious. Rather, it seems to me more obvious that Socrates and Plato have no one thing in common by which they are human. There is the human nature by which Socrates is human, which he does not share in any literal sense with Plato, and there is the human nature by which Plato is human, which he does not share in any literal sense with Socrates. The two natures are not one and the same, but distinct.
4. I would like to close with one more observation, for Bill himself closes on a more general negative note:
I cannot see that the Thomist option is a viable option. I am not saying that the other options are viable. They have their own difficulties. I take this as a bit more evidence for my metaphilosophical thesis that the problems of philosophy, though genuine, are insoluble.
I am not prepared to tackle his skeptical metaphilosophical thesis head-on. But I do want to note that we have in the so-called problem of universals not a genuine problem, but merely a pseudo-problem. That is, we have a problem of universals only if we posit their existence. If we do not posit them, there is no genuine problem.
Bill’s article can be found at:
http://maverickphilosopher.typepad.com/maverick_philosopher/2010/03/scholastic-realism-and-predication.html.
I offer my apologies for this cluncky way of referencing it; I still can’t get the link function to function.
Tags: Anti-realism in the Theory of Universals, Aristotelianism, Bill Vallicella, John Peterson, Neo-Aristotelianism, Platonism, Realism in the Theory of Universals, Universals
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In my immediately preceding post I argued that there is no need to adopt the thesis of realism in the theory of universals in either its Platonist or its Aristotelian version. In today’s post I would like point to an Aristotelian basis for a Neo-Aristotelian anti-realism in the theory of universals.
To recall: the Aristotelian holds, contrary to the Platonist, that that attribute, quality, or nature by which an existent is what it is must be intrinsic to it. For example, that by which Socrates is a human being, his human nature, if you will, must be intrinsic to him; it cannot exist in separation from him. For his part, the Platonist holds, contrary to the Aristotelian, that that by which two or more existents are what they are must exist in separation from both or all of them; it cannot be intrinsic to either or any one of them, for if it were that one alone would be what they all are. Keeping with the examples of the last post, the human nature by which Socrates and George Bush are human beings must exist in separation from both of them; it cannot be intrinsic to either Socrates or George Bush, for if it were that one alone would be human.
The Neo-Aristotelian perspective I have in mind holds, with the Platonist and contrary to the Aristotelian, that there can be no one attribute, quality, or nature existing in both of two or all of many similar things; there cannot be some one human nature intrinsic to both Socrates and George Bush and by which they are human. Yet it also holds, with the Aristotelian and contrary to the Platonist, that that nature by which Socrates is human has to be intrinsic to Socrates and that nature by which George Bush is human has to be intrinsic to George Bush.
There is only one way in which this can be the case. The human nature by which Socrates is human has to be intrinsic to Socrates, the human nature by which George Bush is human has to be intrinsic to George Bush, and the human nature by which Socrates is human has to be distinct from, non-identical to, the human nature by which George Bush is human. There are, to put it more generally, as many human natures as there are humans.
That is, the human nature by which Socrates is human is, not a universal human nature, but a particular human nature. So too for the human nature by which George Bush is human.
There is at least one text of Aristotle himself that lends support to the thesis of particular attributes, qualities, or natures. In his Part I, Section Categories we read him speaking of a “certain whiteness,” which is “present in” a body and, we may add, by which the body is white.
Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not predicable of any subject; or again, a certain whiteness may be present in the body (for colour requires a material basis), yet it is never predicable of anything.
(http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/categories/)
Similarly, an Aristotelian might well and indeed should, while a neo-Aristotelian will, see that a “certain human nature” will be “present in” a human being as that by which he or she is a human being. And thus too for other human beings.
Tags: Anti-realism in the Theory of Universals, Aristotelianism, Aristotle, Attributes, Categories, Nature, Neo-Aristotelianism, Properties, Realism in the Theory of Universals, Universals
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The path which has led me to the present post having been described in my immediately previous post, I will here set forth in as succinct a manner as I can (1) the thesis of realism in the theory of universals, (2) the difference between the two primary versions of that thesis, and (3) the reason why it need not be accepted, even, or indeed especially, from a neo-Aristotelian point of view.
(1) The thesis of realism in the theory of universals holds that for at least some sets of two or more similar existents, there exists some one identical nature or attribute (or form or essence or property, in alternate terminologies) by which the two or more similar existents are what they are and so are similar. Thus, to use the example of Edward Feser in his Aquinas (p. 27), Socrates and George Bush are both humans and so are similar existents. That, however, they are both human is because there exists some one identical nature, in this case human nature, by which they are the humans that they are and so are similar. This doctrine is evident in the following passage of Feser (Ibid., p. 26):
To say that humanity is that which makes all of us human beings implies that this essence is something shared by all human beings, that we all have the same essence; and in general, the essence of a thing is something it shares with others in the same kind. [The emphases are Feser's.]
The doctrine is also evident in the passage of Aquinas’s prologue that is to be the subject of my next “reading.”
Second, this phrase [“most intelligible objects”] can be understood by comparing the intellect with the senses; for while sensory perception is a knowledge of particulars, the intellect seems to differ from sense by reason of the fact that it comprehends universals. Hence that science is pre-eminently intellectual which deals with the most universal principles.
Indeed, it is evident in almost innumerably other passages, of which one (In I metaphysica, Lesson 10, 154) reads:
The truth of this [the thesis of realism in the theory of universals] is clear from the fact that [quoting Aristotle] “many individuals of the same name” are attributed to one Form alone, i.e., there are many individuals which have the same Form predicated of them, and predicated by participation. For the Form or Idea [of man] is the specific nature itself by which there exists man essentially.
(2) The two primary versions of the thesis of realism in the theory of universals are those of Platonism and Aristotelianism. For Platonism, the one identical nature or attribute (or form or essence or property) by which the two or more similar existents are what they are and so are similar exists “outside” or “separated from” the similar existents. If, indeed, the Platonist will reason, the one identical nature were present within any one existent as that by which that existent is what it is, then that one identical nature could not be present in any other existent and thus no other existent would be, at least in that respect, what it is or be similar to the one; the one identical nature cannot, therefore, exist within any of the similar existents and so must exist “outside” all of them. If, then, the one human nature were within, say, the human being that is Socrates, then it would not be within any other existent and so no being other than Socrates would be human or be, as human, similar to Socrates; the one human nature cannot therefore exist within any of the individual humans and so must exist “outside” or “separated from” all of them.
For Aristotelianism the one identical nature or attribute (or form or essence or property) by which the two or more similar existents are what they are and so are similar exists “within” and is not “separated from” the similar existents. If, indeed, the Aristotelian will reason, the one identical nature were not present within all of the similar existents as that by which they are what they are and are thus similar, then they could not be what they are and so could not be thus similar. If, then, the one human nature were not within all human beings, then none of them, not even Socrates, would be a human being.
Thomas, of course, adheres to the Aristotelian version of realism in the theory of universals, as the following text (Ibid., 228), among many others, shows:
Nor can it be said that the Forms [as understood by Plato] are the substances of these sensible things; for the substance of each thing is present in the thing whose substance it is. Therefore, if these Forms were the substances of sensible things, they would be present in sensible things. This is opposed to Plato’s opinion.
3. From a neo-Aristotelian point of view, both the Platonist and the Aristotelian theses are problematic. The Platonist thesis is problematic because, the Aristotelian reasons, if the one identical nature were not present within all of the similar existents as that by which they are what they are and are similar, then they could not all be what they are or be similar. The Aristotelian thesis is problematic because, the Platonist reasons, if the one identical nature were present within any one existent as that by which that existent is what it is, then that one identical nature could not be present in any other existent and thus no other existent would be, at least in that respect, what it is or be similar to the one.
4. The thesis of realism in the theory of universals to which Platonism and Aristotelianism both adhere is, as said above, the thesis that for at least some sets of two or more similar existents, there exists some one identical nature or attribute by which the two or more similar existents are what they are and so are similar. From the point of view of neo-Aristotelianism, however, there is no need to hold to that thesis. One can deny that there is any such one identical nature or attribute by which the two or more similar existents are what they are and so are similar without having to deny either that the two or more are what they are or that they are similar. One can rather affirm that within each of the two or more similar existents there is the nature or attribute by which it is what it is and by which it is similar to the others, which nature or attribute is distinct from, non-identical with, the natures or attributes by which each of the other similar existents are what they are and are similar to the one.
Taking up again the illustration offered by Socrates and George Bush, they are both, from the neo-Aristotelian point of view, human beings and and are so by virtue of having within them the distinct human natures, one distinct human nature by which Socrates is what he is and another, distinct human nature, by which George Bush is what he is.
The neo-Aristotelianism perspective at hand shares with Platonism the understanding that no one numerically identical attribute or property can exist within two non-identical beings. It rejects, however, the Platonist understanding that an attribute or property of a being by which the being is what it is can exist “outside” that being. On the other hand, it shares with Aristotelianism the understanding that an attribute or property of a being by which the being is what it is must exist “within” that being; as Thomas says, it must be “present in the thing whose substance it is.” It rejects, however, the Aristotelian understanding that one numerically identical attribute or property can exist within two non-identical beings.
Tags: Aristotelianism, Attributes, Edward Feser, Individuals, Neo-Aristotelianism, Platonism, Properties, Realism in the Theory of Universals, Similarity, Thomas Aquinas, Universals
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I have not for some time now posted any “readings” of Aquinas’s Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. The primary reason is that I have been led into, as the title of this post has already let you know, a digression within an digression.
The Outer Digression. That is, the passage in Thomas’s prologue which I “read” in my post of July 7, 2011, “Reading Aquinas’s Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle: Reading 3,” concludes with the following statement: “Hence that science which considers first causes also seems to be the ruler of the others in the highest degree.” This, of course, is a complex assertion, complex in that it presupposes true the thesis that there exist the first causes which the science in question considers. Thomas, however, has not, at least thus far in this work, offered any argument that such causes exist.
Thomas did, of course, offer arguments for the existence of a first efficient cause, or God, elsewhere, the best known presentation of which is that of the “Five Ways” in the Summa Theologiae, Part I, Question 2, Article 2. I have then found myself presented, not with just an opportunity to return to the question of the existence of a first efficient cause that I had gotten myself involved with a bit more than a year ago, but with a virtual obligation to do so. For, in a series of posts that began with the “A Few Steps Ahead of Myself: A Note on Infinite Causal Regress” of May 27th, 2010, and ended with the “The Fore-Imaginable Future of Gnosis and Noesis” of August 31, 2010, I set out to present the first three of Aquinas’s “Five Ways” of proving, as he evidently thought he was doing, the existence of God in a fully explicit format. I did so with the aim of laying completely bare for dispassionate examination the logic of Thomas’s arguments.
One result of those efforts was that I arrived at the conclusion that Thomas did not show it to be impossible for there to be an infinite regress in eficient causes or, therefore, that there had to be a first, uncaused, efficient cause of all other existents. More specifically, it came to seem to me that the twentieth-century followers of Thomas had never effectively replied to the critique of the second of the “ways,” and by implication of the first and third, that had been leveled by Paul Edwards in his famous article, “A Critique of the Cosmological Argument,” published as far back as 1959.
I communicated that judgment to Edward Feser, one of today’s most visible Thomists, in a comment on a post on his blog, Edward Feser (at: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/; I am sorry, but I find myself unable to get the linking function to work.). That elicited a response by Feser, in his “Edwards on Infinite Causal Series” of August 23rd, 2010,, in which he offered his understanding of why Edwards and I did not understand the argument that there has to be a first, uncaused cause. Not myself fully understanding his understanding, I gratefully took note of Feser’s recommendation that one read what he had to say on the topic in his book, Aquinas, which, Feser says,
…provides a more thorough, in-depth, and “academic” treatment of the Thomistic arguments for God’s existence than The Last Superstition [Feser's more recent defense of Thomistic theism, which I had criticized in my posts] does. (And without the jokes, polemics, or conservative political asides that some readers – including Hennessey – feel they could live without. But Hennessey does say some kind things about The Last Superstition and about this blog, for which I thank him.)
It has taken far too long, but I have relatively recently started a careful reading of Aquinas with the aim in mind of coming fully to grips with what he has to say about Thomas’s arguments.
The Digression within the Digression. The chapter, however, in Aquinas devoted to natural theology and in which he takes up the proofs for the existence of God follows one devoted to metaphysics. And I have found several theses set forth in that earlier chapter which, shall I say, give me pause. One that is of immediate concern to me as the author of a “super-commentary” on Aquinas’s Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle is the thesis of “moderate realism” in the theory of universals, a thesis to which Aristotle, Aquinas, and Feser all adhere, but before which I pause. The reason that the thesis of “moderate realism” is of immediate concern for this blog is that, as I will point out in the post immediately following this one, the next passage in Thomas’s prologue to his commentary assumes, again without argument, the thesis of “moderate realism” in the theory of universals, according to which universals exist.
Thus the topic to which present series of posts is devoted and its title, “The Problem of Universals.” Neither the topic nor the title are new, but I hope that the ensuing discussion will lead to at least a deeper understanding of the problem of universals or, perhaps, its solution, or even, just perhaps, its dissolution.
Tags: Edward Feser, God, Infinite regress, Paul Edwards, Thomas Aquinas, Universals
Posted in Metaphysics | Comments Off
1. In my post of June 24th, 2011, “A Reading of Aquinas’s Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle: Reading 2,” I presented a lightly edited and regimented version of one and a more thorough reconstruction of the other of the two arguments presented in the first passage in the body of Aquinas’s prologue to his commentary. In this post I propose to do the same for the two arguments presented in the succeeding passage, which reads:
Now the phrase “most intelligible objects” can be understood in three ways. First, from the viewpoint of the order of knowing; for those things from which the intellect derives certitude seem to be more intelligible. Therefore, since the certitude of science is acquired by the intellect knowing causes, a knowledge of causes seems to be intellectual in the highest degree. Hence that science which considers first causes also seems to be the ruler of the others in the highest degree.
The first sentence of the passage serves to introduce the three ways in which it says “the phrase ‘most intelligible objects’ can be understood.” The focus of the remainder of the passage at hand and of this post is on the first way of understanding the phrase.
2. The conclusion of the second of the two arguments presented in this passage, and so of the passage itself, is set forth in its last sentence. If so edited and regimented as to render its expression consistent with the editings and regimentations called for by the two previous posts in this series, it reads:
The science which considers the first causes is the science which is the ruler and master of the other sciences.
I think we can safely assume that Aquinas’s “the ruler of the others [i.e., the other sciences] in the highest degree” is equivalent to “the ruler of the other sciences simpliciter” or “the ruler of the other sciences without qualification,” to, that is, “the ruler of the other sciences,” without qualification.
Note, now, that, because it is an identity, this conclusion is equivalent to the converse:
The science which is the ruler and master of the other sciences is the science which considers the first causes.
It is in this latter form that it has the same subject, though minus the gloss, “wisdom,” as the ultimate conclusion of the immediately previous passage considered in the immediately previous post:
The science, wisdom, which is the ruler and master of the other sciences is the science which treats of the most intelligible objects.
This conclusion, with the gloss, will serve as a premise in the argumentation of the passage under examination in today’s post.
3. We have then in the foregoing both the conclusion of the second of today’s passage’s two arguments and one of its premises. Having thus in hand the second argument’s conclusion, we thereby also have in hand its major and minor terms, the minor term being, of course, the subject of the conclusion, or “the science, wisdom, which is the ruler and master of the other sciences,” and the major term the predicate of the conclusion, or “the science which considers the first causes.”
And having in hand one of its premises, again:
The science, wisdom, which is the ruler and master of the other sciences is the science which treats of the most intelligible objects.
the subject of which is the argument’s minor term, we thereby also have in hand the argument’s middle term, “the science which treats of the most intelligible objects.”
We can therefore spell out the passage’s second argument as:
The science which treats of the most intelligible objects is the science which considers the first causes.
The science, wisdom, which is the ruler and master of the other sciences is the science which treats of the most intelligible objects.
Therefore, the science, wisdom, which is the ruler and master of the other sciences is the science which considers the first causes.
Though its soundness is questionable, because the truth of the minor premise, as was noted in the immediately previous post in this series, has not, at least thus far in this commentary, been demonstrated, the argument is unquestionably valid.
4. a. It still remains to set forth the first argument of the passage, which argument provides us with the major premise of the second argument, again:
The science which treats of the most intelligible objects is the science which considers the first causes.
As the conclusion of the first argument, this proposition has as its subject the first argument’s minor term, “the science which treats of the most intelligible objects,” and as its predicate the first argument’s major term, “the science which considers the first causes.” It remains then to determine the middle term, which term will also serve as the predicate of the minor premise and the subject of the major premise.
4. b. Aquinas’s wording of the first presented of the two needed premises:
Those things from which the intellect derives certitude seem to be more intelligible.
does not so express it that it directly refers to the science under consideration. It can, however, be so revised as to refer directly to that science; if so revised, it reads:
The science of the objects from which the intellect derives certitude is the science which treats of the most intelligible objects.
The converse is, however, needed for the best expression of the first argument:
The science which treats of the most intelligible objects is the science of the objects from which the intellect derives certitude.
4. c. Aquinas’s wording of the second presented of the two needed premises:
The certitude of science is acquired by the intellect knowing causes.
similarly does not so express it that it directly refers to the science under consideration. It too, however, can be so revised as to refer directly to that science; if so revised, it reads:
The science of the objects from which the intellect derives certitude is the science which considers the first causes.
The first argument of the passage under review here is, then:
The science of the objects from which the intellect derives certitude is the science which considers the first causes.
The science which treats of the most intelligible objects is the science of the objects from which the intellect derives certitude.
Therefore, the science which treats of the most intelligible objects is the science which considers the first causes.
5. The assumptions that Aquinas has taken for granted in this passage, as in the previous, are many and significant. One among them is that there are first causes, as opposed, to infinitely regressing series of causes. Another is that there are objects of varying “degrees” of intelligibility, including that of some “most intelligible objects.” At this stage in the reading of Aquinas’s commentary, devoted primarily to the explicit and regimented rendering of its propositions and arguments, we can leave the assumptions as just that, assumptions. I do plan, however, take up the matter of their truth in due course.
Tags: Certitude, First Causes, Iinfinite Causal Regress, Intelligible Objects, Major Premise, Major Term, Minor Premise, Minor Term, Science
Posted in Commentary of Aquinas on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Metaphysics | Comments Off
1. In my post of June 9th, 2011, “A Reading of Aquinas’s Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle: Reading 1,” I presented some lightly edited and regimented versions of the arguments operative in the introductory passage of Aquinas’s prologue. In that passage Aquinas concluded that there is a science which “must be the mistress of all the others” and that this science is “wisdom.”
In this post I propose to do the same for the succeeding passage, the first passage of the body of the prologue, in which passage Aquinas seeks next to determine two things, i.e., as he says, “which science this is and the sort of things with which it is concerned.” The passage in its entirety reads:
We can discover which science this is and the sort of things with which it is concerned by carefully examining the qualities of a good ruler, for just as men of superior intelligence are naturally the rulers and masters of others, whereas those of great physical strength and little intelligence are naturally slaves, as the Philosopher says in the aforementioned book, in a similar way that science which is intellectual in the highest degree should naturally be the ruler of the others. This science is the one which treats of the most intelligible objects.
2. The passage begins with an opening declaration:
We can discover which science this is and the sort of things with which it is concerned by carefully examining the qualities of a good ruler….
It then proceeds to present one argument in its entirety and the conclusion, but only the conclusion, of another argument. The argument given in its entirety concludes with an identification of the science, previously identified as wisdom and as the ruler of the other sciences, further as the “science which is intellectual in the highest degree.” The conclusion of the second, unexpressed, argument yet further identifies it as the science “which treats of the most intelligible objects.”
3. The argument given in its entirety, like the last argument presented in Reading 1, is an argument by analogy. If spelled out in a lightly edited and regimented format, it reads as follows:
As the person who is of superior intelligence is to the other persons, those of less intelligence, so that science which is intellectual in the highest degree is to the other sciences, those which are less intellectual.
The person of superior intelligence is naturally the ruler and master of the other persons.
Therefore, the science which is intellectual in the highest degree is naturally the ruler and master of other sciences.
It is not evident that the argument is a sound argument, for, for one thing, it is not evident that the second premise is true. That is, on one reading of “naturally,” it is often or perhaps even most often not the person of superior intelligence but the person of superior power who is the ruler and master of the others. And, on the reading of “naturally” that is most conducive to the drawing of the conclusion Aquinas is drawing, it would seem that having superior intelligence is but a necessary and not a sufficient condition for being the one who should rule others; surely the one who, in this sense of “naturally,” should rule others must also be just.
4. The conclusion of the other argument, the argument of which the conclusion alone is given, is, if spelled out more explicitly:
The science, wisdom, which is the ruler and master of the other sciences is the science which treats of the most intelligible objects.
Noting that the proposition is an identity, let us assume that the argument is an application of the classical principle of triple identity, or:
Any being is whatever that which it is is.
We can then infer that the science designated by the subject of one of the argument’s premises is the science, wisdom, which is the ruler and master of the other sciences and that the science designated by the predicate of the other of the argument’s premises is the science which treats of the most intelligible objects.
If, next, we note that the conclusion of the previous argument, the one given in its entirety, is, if lightly regimented:
The science which is intellectual in the highest degree is the science, wisdom, which is the ruler and master of other sciences.
and that, as an identity, it is, in accordance with the logic of identity, equivalent to:
The science, wisdom, which is the ruler and master of the other sciences is science which is intellectual in the highest degree.
we find that we have both one of the premises and the middle term of the argument at hand.
We can therefore reconstruct the argument as:
The science which is intellectual in the highest degree is the science which treats of the most intelligible objects.
The science, wisdom, which is the ruler and master of the other sciences is the science which is intellectual in the highest degree.
Therefore, the science, wisdom, which is the ruler and master of the other sciences is the science which treats of the most intelligible objects.
The validity of this argument is fully evident. That it is moreover sound is not fully evident, however, and for two reasons. The first, of course, is that the soundness of the prior argument, from the conclusion of which the minor premise of the present argument is drawn, is not fully evident.
The second is that the truth of the major premise has not been demonstrated. It has not yet, at least so far in this work, been demonstrated that there is, as the use of the definite article implies, but one “science which treats of the most intelligible objects.” More fundamentally, however, it has not yet, at least so far in this work, been demonstrated that there is even one “science which treats of the most intelligible objects.” Yet more fundamentally, it has not yet, at least so far in this work, been demonstrated that there are some “most intelligible objects.”
Tags: Argument by Analogy, Triple Identity, Wisdom
Posted in Commentary of Aquinas on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Metaphysics, Ontology | 2 Comments »
In my post of June 9, 2011, “A Reading of Aquinas’s Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle: Reading 1,” I noted that Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle is a work which “I have longed for decades to read my way through in the deliberate way that a fully fitting reading requires, but have not had the leisure to.” This, of course, is expressive of the “Aristotelian” of the “Neo-Aristotelian Reflections” tagline above.
Another work in metaphysics or ontology which I have for nearly as long desired to so read is Panayot Butchvarov’s Being qua Being. A Theory of Identity, Existence, and Predication (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1979). This case of longing is at least as expressive of the “Neo” of “Neo-Aristotelian Reflections” as it is of the “Aristotelianism,” but the Being qua Being of the title could hardly fail to attract the attention of my inner Aristotelian.
That is, the conception of metaphysics or ontology (as I use the terms “metaphysics” and “ontology” they mean the same thing, but see below) which is the current focus of this blog is very much the one evident in Aristotle’s declaration in his Metaphysics that:
There is a certain science of [the] being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature.
Metaphysicsby Aristotle, translated by W. D. Ross (eBooks@Adelaide, 2007), Book IV, Ch. 1, 1003a21.
And, since on, ontos is the word translated by “being,” that science is quite aptly dubbed ontology. (Perhaps I should too explain here that the “the” in the “science of the being as being” is not some capricious addition of my own; it is needed to translate the “τὸ” of the “τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν” of the original Greek, as can be seen in the text of the Metaphysics provided by the Perseus Project.)
All that having been said by way of introduction, I wish, then, in today’s post to point to what the Aristotelianism in my neo-Aristotelianism worries may be a fundamental problem in Butchvarov’s understanding of the “inquiry into being qua being.” This problem is that his inquiry, at least at this first glance, does not consistently remain an inquiry into being qua being but often shifts into being rather an inquiry into “being” qua “being.” That is, it may, it seems, sometimes be thought to bear upon the concept of being or the mere word, “being,” rather than on the being conceived or designated, on the conceptual and/or linguistic rather than on the extra-conceptual and extra-linguistic.
Thus very early on in Being qua Being (pp. 3-4) we see Butchvarov distinguishing between the “inquiry into being qua being” and metaphysics as follows:
The inquiry into being qua being has been identified with metaphysics. But it would be better to use the term “metaphysics” more broadly, namely, for the branch of philosophy that has as its subject matter the nature of the world, or of reality, rather than the nature of our knowledge, or of our language, or of our sciences about the world.
The distinction being drawn here is between a theory the subject matter of which is extra-conceptual and extra-linguistic and a theory the subject matter of which is conceptual and/or linguistic. This distinction, of course, has to be drawn. The difficulty, however, is that the opposition drawn, while recognizing metaphysics as an inquiry bearing upon the extra-conceptual and extra-linguistic, seems very much to leave the inquiry into being qua being on the other side of the divide, as then an inquiry into the conceptual and/or linguistic. But an inquiry into being qua being can only be an inquiry into the conceptual and/or linguistic if being qua being is conceptual and/or linguistic.
If being qua being were conceptual and/or linguistic, then the world or the reality the nature of which metaphysics, in Butchavarov’s understanding of metaphysics, has as its subject, would as well be conceptual and/or linguistic. On Butchavarov’s understanding, however, as well as my own, that does not seem to be the case.
This post already having gotten long enough, I will postpone to my next post further evidence that Butchavarov’s respect of the distinction between the extra-conceptual and extra-linguistic, on the one hand, and the conceptual and/or linguistic, on the other, is not as definite as it should be.
P. S. The copy of Being qua Being which I have in hand I bought used through amazon.com. It had been discarded by a community college library. I am wondering on what conceivable basis that could have been done.
That being noted, you may easily purchase a copy of the book through amazon.com by clicking on the following link:
Being Qua Being: A Theory of Identity, Existence, and Predication
Tags: Aristotle, Being qua being, Commentary of Aquinas on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Metaphysics, Ontology, Thomas Aquinas
Posted in Metaphysics, Panayot Butcharov | Comments Off
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My Reputation, or Substance and Properties in Anaxagoras, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Butchvarov
July 28th, 20111. In my recent posts I have been focused on Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle and Panayot Butchvarov’s Being qua Being. At times, however, I find myself concerned with my reputation. That is, I find myself concerned that my focus on the metaphysical work of the thirteenth-century CE Aquinas might lead many to dismiss me as a pre-modern and therefore, for some, it follows, an unenlightened thinker, i.e., as a relic of a medievalism enjoying at best but historical interest. The further and ever recurrent recognition, moreover, that Aquinas’s commentary is a commentary on the metaphysical work of the fourth-century BCE Aristotle, which latter can easily be dismissed as not merely pre-modern but even pre-medieval and therefore, for some, it follows, an all the more unenlightened thinker and relic, only intensifies that concern.
2. From time to time, however, I come across coincidences that go some distance towards allaying that concern. This post is about one such coincidence. That is, I recently read the following passage in Butchvarov’s Being qua Being (p. 4):
Reading a passage like this does begin to make me feel better, for it prompts me to begin, almost reflexively, to set up a truth-table. And truth-tables are, after all, if not exactly the latest in intellectual fashion, certainly an integral part of “mathematical” logic and so they at least enjoy respect in contemporary circles.
Let us, then, have “I” abbreviate the proposition, “Individuals exist” and “P” abbreviate the proposition, “Properties exist” (let us also, for simplicity’s sake, allow “properties” to carry “relations” in its wake). Let us next set up the following truth-table, in which, of course, “T” abbreviates “true and “F” “false”:
I P
T T
T F
F T
F F
The nice thing about truth-tables is that the rows represent possible circumstances and that all of the rows taken together represent all possible circumstances. If we now focus on the first row, representing the circumstance in which both the proposition that individuals exist and the proposition that properties exist are true and assume that that is the case, the next step is to ask what, if any, the relationships are which obtain between individuals, on the one hand, and properties, on the other.
The first relationships that offer themselves to one’s consideration are that individuals and properties are identical or not identical, in various ways; one such way is that all individuals are properties and that all properties are individuals, another is that some are and some are not, and a third is that none are, etc. If, then, it is determined, say, for whatever reason that no individuals are properties and no properties are individuals, the question arise once more of what the relationships are which obtain between individuals and properties.
A number of possible relationships suggest themselves. One among the primary among them is that of dependence. That is, some or all individuals may or may not be dependent upon some properties, in some way, etc., etc.
3. Such sets of possible answers having been noted, let’s turn to the following text of Aquinas, from his Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle (Book I, Lesson 12, c. 195), which completes the coincidence:
If we assume, as I will, that the individuals pointed to in Butchvarov’s text are, to use Aquinas’s terminology, substances, we find that Anaxagoras, before Butchavarov, before Aquinas, and even before Aristotle, can be understood as having offered answers to some of the questions raised by Aristotle, Aquinas, and Butchavarov: that of whether both individuals and properties exist (they do) and, if they both do, that of whether they are identical or not (they are not) and that of whether there is a relationship of dependence existing between them (there is not).
4. The point of all of the above is that the same sets of questions were raised by Anaxagoras, by Aristotle, and by Aquinas as have been by Butcharov and that their answers were drawn from the same set of logical possibilities as any which he might offer, for, given the above truth-table, there are no other possibilities. In this respect at least, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Anaxagoras are contemporaries of Butchvarov.
My concerns about my reputation, arising because of my focus on a medieval text commenting on one of ancient metaphysics, have therefore been eased. But not completely, because:
5. Here we are more than halfway through the year 2011 and the other text on which I am focused, Butchvarov’s Being qua Being, was published as long ago as 1979!
Tags: Anaxagoras, Aristotle, Dependence, Identity, Individuals, Panayot Butchvarov, Properties, Relations, Substances, Thomas Aquinas, Truth-tables
Posted in Butchvarov's Being qua Being, Commentary of Aquinas on the Metaphysics of Aristotle | Comments Off