A good friend of mine, and a reader of this blog (the unkind might say that the second descriptor can only apply if the first one does), sent me the following comments and question (lightly edited) via email.
As usual it was good to see you and to have the discussions. I still remember the one in your back yard a couple of years ago. Anyway, I had a thought concerning your seeking a logical proof that god does or does not exist. Besides the fact that this question has been a devoted cause of a great many determined thinkers, there is the real problem of defining what is meant by the term logical. My question is – have you asked yourself why this is such an important issue to you. In short why are you asking the question?
The first sentence refers to a couple of extensive and intensive discussions that he, another good friend and conversation partner, and I had with several others at a social gathering this past Saturday evening. The third sentence refers to my having stated and maintained, in the course of the discussions, the following. First, I want to know, and not just believe, either that there is or that there is not a god, or absolutely perfect being. That is, if there is a god, I want to know, and not just believe, that there is, via a proof that there is, a proof as absolutely and rigorously valid and sound as any to be found in, to look towards that which is generally accepted as the “gold standard” of proof, mathematics. And, if there isn’t a god, I want to know, and not just believe, that there isn’t, via a similarly absolutely and rigorously valid and sound proof. There, in “absolutely and rigorously valid and sound,” lies my understanding of what a “logical” proof is.
The fourth sentence, noting accurately that “[definitively answering] this question [of the existence of a god] has been a devoted cause of a great many determined thinkers,” has as its backdrop the skeptical or agnostic claim that neither the affirmative nor the negative answer to the question of the existence of a god can be proven to be true. This scepticism was shared by both the agnostics who took part in Saturday evening’s conversations and the fideists (fideism, as I use the term, is the thesis that belief, in matters of theology, on the basis of faith can be a justified belief). I for my part maintained that, while I could well accept as plausible, indeed likely, a claim that there has as a matter of fact been no proof in either the affirmative or the negative, I knew of no absolutely and rigorously valid and sound argument proving that there cannot, as a matter of principle, be one.
I could have added more specifically that I am aware of both at least one argument, concluding that there is a god, the validity of which is perfectly evident and at least one argument, concluding that there is no god, the validity of which is perfectly evident. I do not, however, know of any argument, the soundness of which is so evident, concluding that there is a god nor do I know of any argument, the soundness of which is so evident, concluding that there is no god.
I notice that in this post I have been making use of the logician’s technical distinction between “validity” and “soundness” as if it were obvious to all. In the relatively near future, then, I plan to post an explanation of the distinction, so that we are all “on the same page.” I will in addition, to illustrate the distinction, spell out a valid argument, the classical “argument from evil,” the conclusion of which is that there can be no god, or absolutely perfect being. And I will spell it out in such a way that its validity will be perfectly evident, even while its soundness is not.
But now, then, towards an answer to the question posed: I have indeed asked myself why this question of the existence of a god is such an important issue to me. I do not, however, actually have anything like a full answer. As a preface to the minimalist answer that I am now prepared to give, let me note that, from the point of view of science, mathematics, and philosophy, the question of the personal motives of the scientist, the mathematician, or the philosopher are of but secondary interest; the conclusion arrived at and the logical rigor of the steps taken to arrive at it are the matters of primary concern. If I may dare to compare the case of a much the lesser yours truly with the case of a much the greater Stephen Hawking, the question of his personal motives in thinking about, say, the “Big Bang” is of but secondary interest; the conclusion that the “Big Bang” took place and the logical rigor of the steps taken to arrive at that conclusion are the matters of primary concern.
And now, then, what will have to pass as an answer: modifying slightly what I said in my June 14th post in response to another good friend’s question, that of whether or not I believe in a divine being, I will say the following: I both honestly hope that such a divine being does exist, at least the divine being which is such as I would have a divine being be, and honestly fear that there isn’t such a being. I can concurrently both so experience hope and fear, as opposed to joy and sorrow, because, on the one hand, I neither know nor believe that such a divine being exists and yet, on the other, I neither know nor believe that such a divine being does not exist. While I have hopes and fears, I have no knowledge or belief either way. I desire to know, one way or the other.
Why do I so hope, fear, and desire to know? It is because (1) I further hope that life has an other than merely ad hoc purpose and fear that it does not and (2) I have a conception that life has an other than merely ad hoc purpose only if there is a god, that is, an absolutely perfect being. I call it a “conception” because I have not yet given it an articulation sufficient to warrant its being called a hypothesis. Far less have I subjected it to the dialectics of concerted consideration and discussion, weighing its pros and cons. Far, far less have I demonstrated it to be true. I hope, in the (admittedly relatively distant) future, to move in the direction of changing that set of circumstances.
Tags: Argument from Evil, Evil, Logic, Sound Argument, Valid Argument
Here are a couple of issues that fuzzy up the project of finding a proof of the existence or non-existence of “God”.
[1] The term “God” can mean a wide range of things. In order to even ask the question, it is necessary to define the properties (or ranges of properties) of the God that is to be proved or refuted. This may seem obvious, but many people advance a God that is “beyond definition,” or “the thing that is no thing,” etc. These God concepts are likely beyond logical proof/refutation, and are often beyond empirical testing (but see below).
If we define God as someone who can fly, kill people by pointing at them, etc (that is, as something a primitive culture might view as a deity) then God already exists, because we can outfit a person with a jetpack and a machine gun.
On the other hand, if we define God as all powerful and indestructible, then such a God is a logical impossibility, for if it can destroy itself it is not indestructible, and if it can’t destroy itself then it isn’t all-powerful.
[2] There is proof in the logical sense and “proof” in the observational sense.
First, logical proof. Logical proofs are contained in their premises. If you are trying to prove or disprove the existence of a God that is in principle (or by hypothesis) unobservable, then you are probably stuck, as the conclusion can’t be any more than the available premises. (If you want to work only with airtight premises, then you are likely a mathematician … and you won’t get far on this project with math alone). [However, failure to prove or disprove does not mean a reasonable conclusion can’t be drawn … see bottom of this post.]
Next, observation. If I fail to observe God (however defined), that of course does not prove the non-existence of such a God. On the other hand, if I observe something — some thing that I think only “God” could do — this doesn’t prove the existence of God. But with further experiments/observations I might find that there is a better explanation … or I might find that that the God hypothesis is reasonable (and further refine it and test it, in order to determine the properties of this thing that I am calling God). It is indeed possible that the existence of something that could reasonably be called God (not a human with a jetpack and a machine gun, but something more powerful) could be observed and quantified. I mean, if there were priests that could reliably call down a lightening bolt or a fire strike or tornado and raise the dead and foretell future events, then I doubt anyone would ever have doubted the existence of God (and “God” wouldn’t be some mystical “thing that is no thing” but rather an observed agent). Or, even better, let all of this happen without a priest … let’s imagine this God appears to everyone in various forms (burning bush, giant rabbit, etc), and let it hurl lightening bolts, predict the future, and punish criminals. There would be little doubt as to the existence of such an entity, and it would justifiably be called a God.
Now, there is a large range of God concepts that can be cooked up that fall beyond what could be disproven (by logic, because they are inherently contradictory) or “proven” (beyond a reasonable doubt, by repeated observations). Many modern God concepts fall into this category. (Many modern God concepts are also clearly wrong … the God that created the world in six days a few thousand years ago obviously does not exist). That is, for modern God concepts designed by theologians to rebuff basic attacks from philosophers (and withstand the absence of empirical evidence), I don’t think you have much hope of finding a PROOF of existence or non-existence.
However, the lack of PROOF one way or the other doesn’t mean that belief in God (whatever God) is justified. Briefly:
The modern Gods (tweaked by theologians to withstand the various attacks by philosophers and absence of empirical evidence) are riding on the back of the ancient beliefs (in smiting Gods who reduced cities to rubble, etc) that we now know are simply wrong. Few, perhaps almost nobody, would believe in “the God that is no thing” that every instant maintains the existence of the universe (while remaining undetectable) — that is, a God that is omnipotent in theory but impotent with regard to observable impact — if our ancestors hadn’t believed in primitive God concepts (flame-throwing, city-smiting entities) that we now know to be FALSE.
Thus, I think the better question is not whether or not a suitable proof of existence or non-existence can be found, but rather, whether it is reasonable to believe in ideas that, while not disprovable, would not be believed today, if not for previous beliefs in ideas that we now know to be false. This puts Russell’s teapot (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russell‘s_teapot) in play, and the answer is no.