In my previous post I set forth those rudiments of logic that are needed if one is to see that the validity of the argument from evil against the existence of an absolutely perfect god, but not its soundness, is perfectly evident. In this post I will put those rudiments of logic to use.
David Hume, in Part X of his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, after giving due credit for it to Epicurus, presents the argument from evil in the form of a series of questions:
Is he [i.e., God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?
If we put things in a more strictly argumentative form and so revised as to bring in divine knowledge, we have:
If the perfect (and therefore perfect in knowledge, perfect in love, and perfect in power) God exists, then evil cannot exist. But evil does exist. Therefore, the perfect God does not exist.
It is only, however, when we spell it out as follows, expressing both a previously unexpressed but necessary premise and the inferences made to reach the conclusion, that we reach the degree of explicitness that makes its validity patently evident.
1. If the perfect God exists, then evil cannot exist. (Premise)
2. Evil does exist. (Premise)
3. If evil does exist, then evil can exist. (Premise)
4. Therefore, evil can exist. (From propositions 3 and2, by Modus Ponens)
5. Therefore, it is not the case that evil cannot exist. (From proposition 4, by Double Negation)
6. Therefore, it is not the case that the perfect God exists. (From propositions 1 and5,
by Modus Tollens)
That the argument is a valid argument is utterly evident. It is not, however, equally evident that it is sound, because it is not evident that all of the premises are true. One might, it is true, want to say that the third premise, according to which, “if evil does exist, then evil can exist,” is quite evident, for whatever is actual has to be possible. But one might also want to say that it is not evident, for it involves the metaphysics of modality, i.e., of actuality, possibility, necessity, and impossibility, and, one might want to say, the adoption of that metaphysics requires its own justification.
Surely, however, the second premise, that “evil does exist,” cannot simply be taken as evident. A philosophical materialist, holding that only that which can be known through the physical sciences is to be considered real, would deny that evil or even, more simply, the bad has an objective existence; no review, no matter how assiduous, of the index of a physics textbook would turn up either the term “evil” or the term “bad. Some significant argumentation, perhaps a great deal of argumentation would be needed, it seems, to render it evident that evil or the bad, or for that matter the good, exists objectively.
The truth of the first premise is also not fully evident, though neither is its falsehood. At this stage in my thinking on the matter, I will have to content myself with saying that there have been, over the centuries, a great many efforts having as their goal the demonstrating either that the premise is true or that it is false and that, to my knowledge, there has been complete success in neither direction.
I plan, at various points in a fairly indefinite future, to engage in a thorough study of axiomatics, the theory or science of “value,” or the good and the bad. Only then, in my judgment, will I be able to say anything of real worth about the truth or falsity of the first two premises of the argument from evil.
Post Scriptum: If we use “K” to abbreviate “the divine is perfect in knowledge,” “L” to abbreviate “the divine is perfect in love,” “P” to abbreviate “the divine is perfect in power,” and “E” to abbreviate “evil exists,” the following truth table, representing all pertinent possibilities, obtains:
KLPE
TTTT
TTTF
TTFT
TTFF
TFTT
TFTF
TFFT
TFFF
FTTT
FTTF
FTFT
FTFF
FFTT
FFTF
FFFT
FFFF
(I apologize for not yet knowing how to set forth truth-table in a more readable form within the blog.)
The first row, that of TTTT, represents the classical theistic view, whether that of Christianity or that of Islam. The second row represents the view that attempts to solve the problem of evil by denying that evil exists, while retaining the thesis of a god perfect in knowledge, love, and power. The remaining rows represent attempts at solving the problem by denying one, two or all three of the ways at hand in which the divine might be perfect. Thus the third row represents the view, which would be one of a liberal theology, which holds that there is a perfect god, one perfect in knowledge and love, though not in power. And the fifth row represents the view, which would be one of a conservative theology, which holds that there is a perfect god, one perfect in knowledge and power, though not in love.
The fifteenth and sixteenth rows represent two versions or atheism, one of which does and one of which doesn’t admit the objective reality of evil. The fourteenth row represents a truly terrifying version of theism, with a god that is nothing but unguided power.