Posts Tagged ‘Argument from Evil’

The Definition of God: A Reply

Saturday, September 5th, 2009

My friend and colleague Craig Looney has posted a comment (on my August 26th, 2009th post, “On My Motivation in Seeking a Demonstration That There Is or There Is Not a God”) that warrants a response in the form of a post, more visible than a comment on a comment would be. He begins by speaking of “a couple of it issues that fuzzy up the project of finding a proof of the existence or non-existence of ‘God.’” This post is devoted to the first of these issues, which he spells out as:

[1] The term “God” can mean a wide range of things. In order to even ask the question, it is necessary to define the properties (or ranges of properties) of the God that is to be proved or refuted. This may seem obvious, but many people advance a God that is “beyond definition,” or “the thing that is no thing,” etc. These God concepts are likely beyond logical proof/refutation, and are often beyond empirical testing (but see below).

If we define God as someone who can fly, kill people by pointing at them, etc (that is, as something a primitive culture might view as a deity) then God already exists, because we can outfit a person with a jetpack and a machine gun.

On the other hand, if we define God as all powerful and indestructible, then such a God is a logical impossibility, “for if it can destroy itself it is not indestructible, and if it can’t destroy itself then it isn’t all-powerful.

Craig is absolutely right that in saying that “The term ‘God’ can mean a wide range of things” and that “in order to even ask the question, it is necessary to define the properties (or ranges of properties) of the God that is to be proved or refuted.” In this post, therefore, I will begin to deal with the matter of what a god is, if there is one, or would be, if there were one. The raising of this question of the demonstrability of the existence or non-existence of a god has come, however, at an earlier point in the life of this blog than I had foreseen or laid the groundwork for; Nasr does not directly address it in The Garden of Truth. So I am approaching even as basic a matter as the definition of a god with some diffidence and reserving the right to revise later what I have to say now.

That being said, the god the existence of which can be demonstrated must of course be a “logical possibility.” Thus “the thing that is no thing,” taken thus baldly, is clearly not something that can be demonstrated to exist. In fact, contra Craig, its existence can be immediately refuted, for, applying the Principle of Non-Contradiction, no being or existent can be both a thing and not a thing, in any one respect and at any one time. Of course, if by “the thing that is no thing” we actually mean “the being that is no physical thing,” the immediate refutation just given is no longer relevant.

Going with Craig a bit deeper, a god that is “all powerful and indestructible” is indeed “a logical impossibility,” for, as he says, “if it can destroy itself it is not indestructible, and if it can’t destroy itself then it isn’t all-powerful.” But all is not lost here, for that observation does not rule out as logically impossible an indestructible god that is, not simply all-powerful, but, to use a formulation that is perhaps good enough for the time being, capable of doing all that is possible. (I say “perhaps good enough for the time being” because there is much in “capable of doing all that is possible” that begs for further elucidation, e.g., just what does the “doing” or activity of a god consist in.)

Now if it exists, the god of which I have said, in the post immediately previous to this one, that I hope it exists and fear it does not and the existence of which I hope to eventually prove or disprove is an absolutely perfect being, an ens perfectissimum. From this and some allied assumptions it follows that it is a being absolutely perfect in knowledge, in love and will, and in power, and perhaps in yet other things (e.g., aesthetic appreciation of the beautiful). (All this is said in full awareness that there is much that needs to be made explicit in just what a perfect being might be and even more so in just what a being perfect in knowledge, in love and will, and in power might be.)

That’s on the one hand. On another hand, in the immediately previous post I made reference to an argument for the existence of a god, the validity of which is evident, though its soundness is not. That argument is not one that makes use of “perfect being” or “being perfect in knowledge, in love and will, and in power” as the operative definition. A variation of the kind of argument evident in the first two of Thomas Aquinas’s quinque viae, it has as a point of departure a definition of a god looking something like this: “an efficient cause of all other beings and effect of no other,” i.e., an “uncaused cause.” All this needs spelling out and that such a being would in fact be perfect requires further demonstration. So too would the thesis that that god is unique, not just a god, but the god.

On a third hand, if I may, in the immediately previous post I also made reference to an argument for the non-existence of a god, the validity of which argument is evident, though its soundness is not. This argument, known as the argument “from evil,” does make use of a conception of a god as a “being perfect in knowledge, in love and will, and in power.”

Setting my review of The Garden of Truth aside a bit longer, in my next post I will spell out the argument from evil in the way that I think it has to be spelled out.

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On My Motivation in Seeking a Demonstration That There Is or There Is Not a God

Wednesday, August 26th, 2009

A good friend of mine, and a reader of this blog (the unkind might say that the second descriptor can only apply if the first one does), sent me the following comments and question (lightly edited) via email.

As usual it was good to see you and to have the discussions. I still remember the one in your back yard a couple of years ago. Anyway, I had a thought concerning your seeking a logical proof that god does or does not exist. Besides the fact that this question has been a devoted cause of a great many determined thinkers, there is the real problem of defining what is meant by the term logical. My question is – have you asked yourself why this is such an important issue to you. In short why are you asking the question?

The first sentence refers to a couple of extensive and intensive discussions that he, another good friend and conversation partner, and I had with several others at a social gathering this past Saturday evening. The third sentence refers to my having stated and maintained, in the course of the discussions, the following. First, I want to know, and not just believe, either that there is or that there is not a god, or absolutely perfect being. That is, if there is a god, I want to know, and not just believe, that there is, via a proof that there is, a proof as absolutely and rigorously valid and sound as any to be found in, to look towards that which is generally accepted as the “gold standard” of proof, mathematics. And, if there isn’t a god, I want to know, and not just believe, that there isn’t, via a similarly absolutely and rigorously valid and sound proof. There, in “absolutely and rigorously valid and sound,” lies my understanding of what a “logical” proof is.

The fourth sentence, noting accurately that “[definitively answering] this question [of the existence of a god] has been a devoted cause of a great many determined thinkers,” has as its backdrop the skeptical or agnostic claim that neither the affirmative nor the negative answer to the question of the existence of a god can be proven to be true. This scepticism was shared by both the agnostics who took part in Saturday evening’s conversations and the fideists (fideism, as I use the term, is the thesis that belief, in matters of theology, on the basis of faith can be a justified belief). I for my part maintained that, while I could well accept as plausible, indeed likely, a claim that there has as a matter of fact been no proof in either the affirmative or the negative, I knew of no absolutely and rigorously valid and sound argument proving that there cannot, as a matter of principle, be one.

I could have added more specifically that I am aware of both at least one argument, concluding that there is a god, the validity of which is perfectly evident and at least one argument, concluding that there is no god, the validity of which is perfectly evident. I do not, however, know of any argument, the soundness of which is so evident, concluding that there is a god nor do I know of any argument, the soundness of which is so evident, concluding that there is no god.

I notice that in this post I have been making use of the logician’s technical distinction between “validity” and “soundness” as if it were obvious to all. In the relatively near future, then, I plan to post an explanation of the distinction, so that we are all “on the same page.” I will in addition, to illustrate the distinction, spell out a valid argument, the classical “argument from evil,” the conclusion of which is that there can be no god, or absolutely perfect being. And I will spell it out in such a way that its validity will be perfectly evident, even while its soundness is not.

But now, then, towards an answer to the question posed: I have indeed asked myself why this question of the existence of a god is such an important issue to me. I do not, however, actually have anything like a full answer. As a preface to the minimalist answer that I am now prepared to give, let me note that, from the point of view of science, mathematics, and philosophy, the question of the personal motives of the scientist, the mathematician, or the philosopher are of but secondary interest; the conclusion arrived at and the logical rigor of the steps taken to arrive at it are the matters of primary concern. If I may dare to compare the case of a much the lesser yours truly with the case of a much the greater Stephen Hawking, the question of his personal motives in thinking about, say, the “Big Bang” is of but secondary interest; the conclusion that the “Big Bang” took place and the logical rigor of the steps taken to arrive at that conclusion are the matters of primary concern.

And now, then, what will have to pass as an answer: modifying slightly what I said in my June 14th post in response to another good friend’s question, that of whether or not I believe in a divine being, I will say the following: I both honestly hope that such a divine being does exist, at least the divine being which is such as I would have a divine being be, and honestly fear that there isn’t such a being. I can concurrently both so experience hope and fear, as opposed to joy and sorrow, because, on the one hand, I neither know nor believe that such a divine being exists and yet, on the other, I neither know nor believe that such a divine being does not exist. While I have hopes and fears, I have no knowledge or belief either way. I desire to know, one way or the other.

Why do I so hope, fear, and desire to know? It is because (1) I further hope that life has an other than merely ad hoc purpose and fear that it does not and (2) I have a conception that life has an other than merely ad hoc purpose only if there is a god, that is, an absolutely perfect being. I call it a “conception” because I have not yet given it an articulation sufficient to warrant its being called a hypothesis. Far less have I subjected it to the dialectics of concerted consideration and discussion, weighing its pros and cons. Far, far less have I demonstrated it to be true. I hope, in the (admittedly relatively distant) future, to move in the direction of changing that set of circumstances.

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