Posts Tagged ‘Knowledge’

The Mutual “Inness” of the Human and the Divine

Wednesday, September 30th, 2009

In my previous planned and on-topic post, the “Where We Are Coming from and Where We Are Going to: 6” of August 23, I distinguished between two distinct, as I was then thinking, understandings, of the nature of God, the human, and the relation of the human to God, as two distinct potential metaphysical foundations for gnosticism.

One of the two understandings, I said, is contained in the thesis that I have identified (in the June 28th, 2009, post, “Nasr’s Gnosis and ‘Theomonism’”) as theomonism, the thesis that the divine being is the one and only real being. In “Where We Are Coming from and Where We Are Going to: 6” I offered the following argument against that thesis, an argument the validity of which is quite evident and the soundness of which is, if not quite as quite evident, immediately adjacent to being so.

1. If there is anything that is in any way other than the one and only divine being (if such latter there indeed is), then the one and only divine being is not the only being.

2. There is something that is in some way other than the one and only divine being (I offer my own being as evidence; you can offer yours).

3. Therefore, the one and only divine being is not the only being.

It follows that, since it is false, the thesis of theomonism cannot serve as a basis for the doctrine of gnosticism.

I closed “Where We Are Coming from and Where We Are Going to: 6” by saying that in the post that ended up being the present one I would “take a look at the other of the two distinct understandings … as a second potential metaphysical foundation for gnosticism, different [from theomonism] but also figuring prominently in The Garden of Truth.” This understanding, encapsulated in the title of today’s post, “The Mutual ‘Inness’ of the Human and the Divine,” can be put a bit more explicitly as: God is in us and we are in God.

Nasr’s statement of the thesis of the mutual “inness” of the human and the divine is contained in a sequence of three densely packed paragraphs (The Garden of Truth, pp. 5-6). In the first of these three paragraphs, we read:

[Sufism] provides, within the spiritual universe of the Islamic tradition, the light necessary to illuminate the dark corners of our soul and the keys to open the doors to the hidden recesses of our being so that we can journey within and know ourselves, this knowledge leading ultimately to the knowledge of God, who resides in our heart/center.

By journeying within ourselves, we journey to God, who resides in, and therefore is in, our “heart/center.”

The next paragraph distinguishes between the being in God which we both have eternally had and even now have and the created being which we also have now. It reads:

Not only were we created by God, but we have the root of our existence here and now in Him. When we bore witness to His Lordship as mentioned in the Quranic verse, “Am I not your Lord?” the world and all that is in it were not as yet created. Even now we have our pre-eternal existence in the Divine Presence, and we have made an eternal covenant with God, which remains valid beyond the contingencies of our earthly life and beyond the realm of space and time in which we now find ourselves.

That is, we have been and are in God.

Besides introducing two other key themes, that of a “fall” and that of our having “become forgetful beings,” the next paragraph confirms both of the beings in, ours in God (“our reality in God”) and God’s in us (“God, who resides at the depths of our being”).

The answer to the question “who are we?”is related in a principial manner to our ultimate reality in God, a reality that we have now forgotten as a result of the fall from our original and primordial state and the subsequent decay in the human condition caused by the downward flow of time. We have become forgetful beings, no longer knowing who we are and therefore what our purpose is in this life. But our reality in God, who resides at the depths of our being, is still there. We need to awaken to this reality and to realize our true identity, that is, to know who we really are.

Now to the point of the present post and the reason why I have had second thoughts about holding that the thesis of the mutual “inness” is distinct from that of theomonism: if by “in” is meant “entirely in” and if the sense in which the one is in the other is the same as the sense in which the other is in the one, then if there is an existent a and an existent b such that a is in b and b is in a, then a and b must be at least co-extensive. And the thesis that the human, in its true identity, is at least co-extensive with the divine is consistent with, indeed implied by, the theomonist thesis.

It seems to me that both the theomonist thesis that only the divine is real and thus that, if we are real, we are identical with the divine and the thesis of mutual “inness,” such that we and God are at least co-extensive, provide all too simple answers to the question of how humans can enjoy an immediate and direct knowledge of the divine, the “beatific vision,” in this life. If identity or co-extensiveness were sufficient conditions of knowledge, then the coffee cup to which I have turned so frequently this morning would know itself.

In the next planned and on-topic post, I will have something to say about the “fall” and our having “become forgetful beings” that Nasr speaks about.

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The Garden of Truth: The Vision and Promise of Sufism, Islam’s Mystical Tradition

The Question of My “Belief in” a Divine Being

Sunday, June 14th, 2009

A good friend sent me a challenging comment (thereby reversing the direction of my observation that no good friendship goes unpunished) via email that reads:

So, do you or do you not believe in a divine? What is your apriori ontology that drives all this epistemology?

Fess up, boy. Don’t hide behind a philosophical smokescreen to obscure your religious, non-religious or anti-religious stance…

I see at least three issues here:

1. That of whether or not I “believe in” a divine being.
2. That of what the “ontology” is that drives all the epistemology evident in the first post.
3. That of a philosophical smokescreen obscuring my “religious, non-religious or anti-religious stance.”

In this post I will respond to the first issue, returning to the others in later posts.

Let me begin by stating directly that I do not “believe in” a divine being. There is, however, more to say, for one who “believes in” a divine being must logically believe that a divine being exists. Now I will happily “fess up” that I honestly hope such a being does exist, at least the divine being which in its nature is such as I would have a divine being be. But the “fession” would be incomplete without my also “fessing up” that I fear too that there isn’t such a being. I concurrently both so hope and so fear because, on the one hand, I do not believe that such a divine being exists and yet, on the other, I do not believe that such a divine being does not exist. While I have hopes and fears, I have no belief either way.

From the perspective of this blog, moreover, it is immaterial whether or not I believe in one way or the other. As the blog is “an on-going essay in Neo-Aristotelian philosophy,” the more fully pertinent issue is that of what I know, not that of what I believe. And, as I said in the previous post:

[M]y efforts will be genuinely exploratory in their nature in this at least: using the expression “sound argument” in the logician’s technical sense of “a valid argument of which the premises are all true (and so therefore also the conclusion),” I at this point know of no sound argument demonstrating the truth of any of the above gnostic theses and I know of no sound argument demonstrating their falsehood. I moreover know of no sound argument demonstrating that there can be no such sound arguments. Nothing, as I see it, has been definitively settled and I wish to do whatever I can to settle, perhaps even definitively settle, at least some things.

Were then I to but believe that there is a divine being, that would not be enough to satisfy the aims of the exploration at hand, for I would still not know that there is a divine being. And were I to but believe that there is no divine being, that would not be enough to satisfy the aims of the exploration at hand, for I would still not know that there is no divine being.